## Say No

### 1NC – Say No – Small States

#### Small states have considerable power – they’ll fight tooth to tooth.

Karoliina Honkanen 2, researcher in the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, M.A. in Social Sciences and International Relations from the University of Helsinki, founding Member of the Atlantic Council of Finland, 11/2002, “The Influence of Small States on NATO-Decision Making,” ISSN: 1650-1942, RMax

6.2 The Means of Influence for Small States Within NATO

The important strategic location of Denmark and Norway in the Cold War context helped them to set conditions on their membership. Restrictions on membership were a special measure considering the tense international situation and the fact that it was not employed by the other Allies (at least to the same degree). Denmark was in the key position as a "cork" to the Baltic Sea and because it possessed Greenland. The "Greenland card" was skillfully played by the Danish decision-makers to increase their negotiation position vis-à-vis the US. In the late 1950s, the Danish decision- makers often emphasized that the US air bases in Greenland must be taken into ac- count when making an overall assessment of Denmark's contribution to NATO, which was seen as a veiled threat by the US decision-makers.

Norway was obviously important to NATO due to its border with the Soviet Union, and as a key to controlling the sea lines of communication over the Atlantic. Early in the Cold War the Norwegian negotiation position vis-à-vis the US was also improved because it was considered that the Norwegians had an influence on Denmark and Iceland." When the Soviet military build-up in the Kola region increased in the 1970s, Norway's location became even more important.

Later on, the Danish and Norwegian nuclear restrictions were accepted by the other Allies because the non-nuclear status of these countries had come to be regarded by the other Allies as an accepted part of the equilibrium in Northern Europe, and more generally of the European order.?

It has been interpreted in Denmark that its important strategic location and possession of Greenland allowed it more freedom in defense spending; Denmark had a " discount" on defense spending thanks to Greenland." At the 1978 Summit in Washington, the Allies decided that they would increase their defense budgets by 3% of net growth yearly. Denmark submitted a formal reservation to this decision, provoking accusations of freeloading by the other Allies (especially the US).

A country's use of its important strategic location to increase its bargaining power is a means identified in the classical variant of Realism (see 1.3): the bargaining power of small allies in a bipolar world increases when they control resources needed by the superpowers. There is an interesting paradox related to the ability of small states to set conditions on their membership. They had more influence when they joined in a Realist context (i.e. during the early Cold War). After all, it is assumed in Realism that the influence of small states is marginal.'

In the post-Cold War environment, small NATO members have also played the "strategic card". While still an aspirant state, some Hungarian officials gave the impression that allowing NATO bases in Hungary would be an important contribution which would allow the country to postpone purchases of new systems and army re- forms." In order to improve their membership prospects, the Southern European NATO candidates (Bulgaria and Romania) have appealed to their important location and to their assistance to NATO during the Kosovo crisis. Romania and Bulgaria have assisted the US also in the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and offered bases to be used in a possible attack against Iraq." Bulgaria and Romania seem to have benefited from playing the strategic card: they are very likely to receive a membership invitation at the Prague Summit, even though they have problems in fulfilling NATO's political criteria. '2

Since NATO is an Alliance of democracies, Liberal means of influence have also proved effective. One of them is appealing to domestic pressures and constraints (see 1.3). Denmark and Norway played the Cold War. To counter the constant criticism of its low defense spending, Denmark replied that additional spending would nurture anti-NATO and neutralistic attitudes in the country.' According to the Norwegian decision-makers, Norway was entitled to have the special restrictions on its membership because it was a "special case" = not only was it located next to the eastern superpower but public opinion in the country was critical. 14

The domestic card was also played by the Scandinavian Allies in NATO's internal discussions on Greek and Turkish membership in the early 1950s - though without success. The Danish Prime Minister argued that the majority of Danes supported NATO as a political alliance, not as a military alliance - the membership of Greece and Turkey would strengthen the latter view and thereby endanger the ratification of the enlargement in the Danish Folketing.' When campaigning for NATO and EU membership, the leaders of Central and Eastern European countries appealed to domestic pressures - to the frustration of their citizens if the reforms and sacrifices did not bring results.

An example of skillful argumentation is an appeal to NATO's fundamental values as an alliance of democracies. Appealing to the values underpinning NATO is a typical Liberal means of influence used both during and after the Cold War by several small Allies. In the Cold War era, it was used by Denmark and Norway when opposing Greek and Turkish membership. The Scandinavian Allies stressed NATO's character as an organization of democracies and pointed out that Greece and Turkey were not like- minded states.

When campaigning for NATO membership, the Czech Republic and Hungary appealed to the fundamental values of the Euro-Atlantic liberal community and presented themselves as a natural part of that community. To some extent, the leaders of the US and Germany - the key players in the first post-Cold War enlargement round were responsive to these arguments. 16

The Danes have promoted the inclusion of the Baltic states in NATO by, for instance, referring to NATO as a value community of democracies and by stressing every democracy's right to join NATO. The logic of this argument perpetuates the enlargement process; NATO's door cannot be closed as long as there are democratic countries outside. Frank Schimmelfennig has noted that the public commitment to the moral aspects of enlargement in the first round makes it difficult for the supporters of the first round not to support further enlargement - even though their motivation for the first enlargement round might have been selfish.'

Another example of skillful argumentation in Denmark's support of the Baltic states' membership aspirations is to stress a merit-based approach to the selection of new members. This is an efficient means, since merits are the best justification for Baltic membership. The Balkan candidates can refer to the importance of their location to NATO's operations in the Balkans and to the aid they gave NATO in the Kosovo conflict. Denmark has been vocal in keeping up the official NATO position that all interested European democracies should have the same opportunities to join NATO regardless of their history or geography." The Danes were active in the establishment of the MAP process, which gives NATO a means to evaluate the candidate countries' progress.

A relevant means of influence is activism and the proposing of initiatives. The activism of small states in the Cold War NATO was limited by the fact that they needed NATO for security protection, and possible efforts for activism were conducted in other international organizations. Moreover, NATO's agenda was much more limited than it is now. Still, there are examples of small-state activism in NATO even during the Cold War. For example, in the 1960s, Denmark and Norway took an active part in NATO discussions and managed to have their voice heard in drafting the Harmel report.

Particularly since the Cold War, activism is required from any small country which wants to have influence within NATO. In contrast to the Cold War circumstances, the control of an important resource needed by leading NATO members is not enough. A good example of post-Cold War activism in NATO is Denmark, especially its efforts to promote Baltic membership. Danish activism has taken place at different levels: bilateral relations, the framework of the PP program, and internal NATO discussions.

Means of influence deriving from NATO's decision-making system are capable representatives in different NATO councils, securing high NATO posts for a citizen of one's own country and skillful coalition-building. Since representatives of small member states seldom present an initiative without prior consultation, an ability to align with like-minded states and persuade those opposing is of great importance. Coalitions are not only built among different member states, but coalition-building can take place at the level of representatives of governmental sub-units of different countries. These "transgovernmental" coalitions aim at influencing public opinion in the leading country of the Alliance."

### 2NC – Normal Means – Yes Consensus

#### Normal means is consensus – every decision at all levels is required to use it

Traugutt ’16 [Loren G, June 2016, "NDC Research Report," NATO Defense College: CSS, <https://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/publications/publication.html/dfffbde2-32dd-41c9-9492-09c67a62fa97>, St. Mark’s, AshritM]

The treaty does not specify how the Alliance should make decisions, except for Article 10 which states that “unanimous agreement” is required to invite new members into the NATO Alliance.3 Beyond this clear directive on decision-making, the rest of NATO’s decision-making process was left by the founders of the Alliance to determine for themselves. While decision-making through consensus is nothing new within alliances and organizations, its sole use in determining all decisions at all levels of an organization is unique. Numerous other international organizations, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the European Union and the International Monetary Fund, utilize the consensus principle as part of their decision-making process, but none of them use it as their sole process.4 Despite a growing Alliance where reaching consensus will become harder and harder, keeping NATO’s current “consensus rule” is paramount for the Alliance to maintain its legitimacy and influence throughout the ever-changing global security environment. As described on the NATO website, “All NATO decisions are made by consensus, after discussion and consultation among member countries. A decision reached by consensus is an agreement reached by common consent, a decision that is accepted by each member country … [an] expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance. This principle is applied at every committee level and demonstrates clearly that NATO decisions are collective decisions made by its member countries … The consensus principle applies throughout NATO.”5 Three times in its history NATO has undergone a thorough review of its committee organization and structure. The first took place in 1990 following the end of the Cold War, again in 2002 following the 9/11 terror attacks, and the most recent review was in June 2010. In all three instances, the Alliance retained the principle of consensus decision-making, applying it within every committee and working group at all levels of NATO.

### 2NC – NATO Channels – Yes Consensus

#### The plan’s use of formal channels to make a decision must be unanimous – their ev is about individual subgroups conducting independent “NATO operations”

Masters ’22 [Jonathan, 5-4-2022, "An Unsettled Alliance," Council on Foreign Relations, <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-nato>, St. Mark’s, AM]

NATO's Structure

Headquartered in Brussels, NATO is a consensus-based alliance in which decisions must be unanimous. However, individual states or subgroups of allies can initiate action outside NATO’s auspices. For instance, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom began policing a UN-sanctioned no-fly zone in Libya in early 2011 and, within days, transferred command of the operation to NATO once Turkey’s concerns had been allayed. Member states are not required to participate in every NATO operation; Germany and Poland declined to contribute directly to the campaign in Libya.

### 2NC – AT: Silence Procedure

#### NATO’s silence procedure can be broken by any member state—it’s functionally consensus

PDO ‘3 [PDO, 2-11-2003, "France, Belgium Break NATO's Silence Procedure on Iraq Issue," People’s Daily Online, <http://en.people.cn/200302/11/eng20030211_111488.shtml>, St. Mark’s, AM]

NATO's Secretary-General George Robertson invoked the "silence procedure" last Thursday, setting 0900 GMT Monday as the deadline. If no member state breaks the silence, NATO would regard it as a consensus on the issue and would immediately set out making military plans in this respect.

The move of France and Belgium was widely regarded as a clear indication of the deepening divide among NATO member states on the Iraq issue.

The "silence procedure" is one of the often-used prerogatives of the secretary-general, who will decide on the length of the silence based on the nature of the issue under discussion.

#### It’s up to the secretary general and any country can protest

Rasmussen ’10 [Anders Fogh, former NATO secretary general, 8-12-2010, “NATO Military Concept for Strategic Communications,” NATO, <https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-STRATCOM-Concept.pdf>, St. Mark’s, AM]

I do not believe the document requires discussion by Council. Therefore, if I do not hear to the contrary by 17.30 hours on Wednesday, 18 August 2010, I shall assume that the Council has approved the Military Concept for NATO Strategic Communications.